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Abstract. While there are both successes and challenges
related to the use of interstate water compacts, in their most
effective forms they allow states to take a comprehensive,
holistic approach to water management. Successful compacts
tend to encompass the natural hydrologic boundaries of the
water basin. They are more likely to utilize a commission type
governance structure with sufficient authority to carry out the
mission and goals of the compacting agreement. Successful
compacts are flexible and allow for future developments
(including climate change) while being cognizant of the
need to protect and enhance the environment. They are also
sensitive to the needs and desires of various stakeholders,
including federal, state, and local governments as well as
non-governmental organizations.
Water compacts also face a variety of challenges. They
must answer to a wide and diverse constituent base, often
with conflicting interests. Stronger states can and do attempt
to “bully” other states, severely limiting or eliminating
altogether the usefulness of the compact. Governance
structures that fail to integrate the interests of all states into
a single body simply make the compact into an arena where
small scale water wars can be fought.
To illustrate an area where interstate water compacts
could make a significant contribution, this paper
concludes with a case study highlighting South Carolina’s
transboundary water issues with North Carolina and Georgia.
Recommendations for South Carolina include beginning
negotiations toward the development of federal-interstate
compacts as well as considering action in the Supreme Court
in the event that these negotiations fail.

That statement was made nearly ten years ago. Since
then, increasing population, climate change and new
technologies are putting even more pressure on water
resources. States are having to re-evaluate how they manage
these assets, both within their borders and those that are
shared with neighboring states. As part of this process,
state officials need to develop a clear picture of what future
needs and conflicts may emerge and how these might be
mitigated. They also need to prepare flexible mechanisms
for dealing with the uncertainty that accompanies almost any
planning effort. Without the means to successfully address
transboundary water issues, options are limited and too often
result in undesirable outcomes.
The purpose of this paper is to examine federalinterstate compacts as a possible solution to both existing
and emerging issues related to shared water resources. It
provides an overview of the advantages and challenges of
utilizing interstate compacts as well as giving examples of
compacts that have experienced various rates of success.
Furthermore, it examines transboundary water issues and the
prospect of compact development in South Carolina.
The information in this paper is especially relevant
for those who are charged with providing solutions
to problems emerging from shared water resources. It
provides an alternative to piecemeal administration that is
not equipped to deal with problems that require the broad
participation of other parties to solve. Overall, this paper
illustrates a mechanism that allows for extensive stakeholder
participation within a comprehensive, flexible framework
that has been shown to work in complex transboundary
water resource situations.

INTRODUCTION

METHODOLOGY

Of the fifty states that comprise the United
States of America, only two - Alaska and
Hawaii - do not share a ground or surface water
resource with another state. Accordingly…the
forty-eight contiguous states fall into one of
two categories: those states that are (or have
been) involved in an interstate water conflict or
those states that are going to be involved in an
interstate water conflict (Sherk, 2005, p.765).

This paper is a comparative study of factors that likely
influence the success or failure of interstate water compacts.
It utilizes scholarly writings, legal and historical sources,
governmental and non-governmental reports, and media
sources. It also relies substantively on the work of the Utton
Transboundary Resource Center at the University of New
Mexico School of Law as a guide to compact development
and function. It concludes with a case study that uses the
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findings from the research to provide an example of the
possible utilization of interstate compacts for water resource
management in South Carolina.

explained why adjudication was not the most efficient way
to solve interstate water disputes.
The reason for judicial caution in adjudicating
the relative rights of States in such cases is that,
while we have jurisdiction of such disputes…
they involve the interests of quasi-sovereigns,
present complicated and delicate questions,
and, due to the possibility of future change of
conditions, necessitate expert administration
rather than judicial imposition of a hard and
fast rule. Such controversies may appropriately
be composed by negotiation and agreement,
pursuant to the compact clause [emphasis
added] of the federal Constitution. We say of
this case, as the court has said of interstate
differences of like nature, that such mutual
accommodation and agreement should, if
possible, be the medium of settlement, instead
of invocation of our adjudicatory power (1943,
320 U.S. 383).

BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Under federalism, states have primary responsibility
for water within their borders while the federal government
regulates and manages water resources under the Commerce
Clause, the Federal Clean Water Act, the Endangered Species
Act, the Rivers and Harbors Act and in conjunction with
the Army Corps of Engineers. The federal government also
constructs and controls large-scale reclamation and flood
control projects and licenses non-federal hydropower projects
through the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Muys,
1995). This jumble of responsibilities often leads to ambiguity
as to what federal or state entity has jurisdiction over a specific
body of water or section of river, ultimately resulting in some
degree of conflict (Mandarano, Featherstone, and Paulsen,
2008). Lepawsky stated the problem rather succinctly when he
said, “Few functions of the American Federal system seem less
suited physically to state boundaries than the management of
our water resources” (1950, p. 631). Mandarano, Featherstone,
and Paulsen comment in more detail.

Furthermore, in Nebraska v. Wyoming, the Court
reiterated that in undertaking the apportionment of an
interstate river, they would “embark upon an enterprise
involving administrative functions beyond our province”
(1945, 325 U.S. 616). Clearly, the Court believes that
compacts are a viable tool for managing water resources that
cross state lines and should be utilized whenever possible.
As such, interstate compacts can serve as a platform for
intergovernmental cooperation. They allow states to exercise
authority over issues within their purview while relieving
the federal government of responsibility for problems better
left to the states. At the same time, they provide a method
for states and the federal government to work together to
“solve mutual problems in a collective fashion” (Kearney
and Stucker, 1985, p. 210).

Water and federalism are a complicated mix
as water flows through the hydrologic cycle
without regard to political boundaries. The
physical boundaries of river basins do not
coincide with the geographic boundaries of
political jurisdictions. The management of
interstate water resources is complicated by
the multiple, conflicting, and overlapping
functions and interests of federal and state
governments, and is further complicated by
conflicting regulatory authority and policy
priorities between different federal agencies
(2008, p. 136).

Basically, the compact is a legal agreement
between two or more states entered into in order
to deal with a problem or concern that crosses
state boundaries. Because of its contractual
nature, a compact takes precedence over prior
law and over legislation that may later be
enacted by member states. Because a compact
is also a contract between the participating
states, it differs from other statutes. As a
contract, an interstate compact is binding on
member states in the same manner as any
other contract entered into by an individual
or corporation. Once entered into, compacts
cannot be unilaterally amended or repealed;
they are binding on all citizens of the signatory
states. If a state violates or fails to honor the
terms of a compact, an offended state or states
may sue in state or federal court (Florestano,
1994, p. 14).

Compacts, as problem-solving mechanisms, date back
to the pre-revolutionary period. Their origins emerged, for
the most part, from early boundary disputes that were settled
by negotiated agreements between the colonies and were
contingent upon the approval of the Crown (Kearney and
Stucker, 1985). Later, in the Articles of the Confederation,
compacts reflected the need to settle disputes among states
as well as to protect the new nation “from the destructive
political combination of two or more States” (Frankfurter
and Landis, 1925, p. 693). In the same vein, Article 1, §10,
Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution forbids states to enter
into agreements among themselves without the approval of
Congress (U.S. Constitution, Article I., n.d.), reinforcing the
importance of compacts as tools for protecting the union as
well as solving problems between states.
The Supreme Court has made itself clear on the issue of
intervening between states. In Colorado v. Kansas, the Court
25

Roper
Compacts can be relatively simple or they can be
comprehensive documents that can consist of nearly unlimited
combinations of goals, purposes, and organizational structures
(Frankfurter and Landis, 1925). In general, compacts provide
a principal means by which states can allocate water from
common river systems, they help provide for efficient use
and equitable apportionment of shared resources, and they
serve to administer rules and develop strategies to insure
compliance (Schlager and Heikkila, 2009). Compacts have
changed over time and vary according to scope. Among the
early compacts, the chief water officials for the participating
states were responsible for gathering hydrologic data on
water supplies and usage and issuing regulations to carry
out the apportionment plan (Muys, 1995). Later and more
comprehensive compacts such as the Delaware River Basin
Compact cover issues of water supply, pollution control,
flood protection, watershed management (soil conservation,
forestry, and fish and wildlife), recreation, hydropower, and
regulate water withdrawals and diversions (See Ankersen and
Hamann, 1996, p. 506).
Two major types of interstate compacts have emerged from
the range of possibilities for organizational structures. The first
is a compact between states, ratified by the states’ legislatures
and by Congress but without the federal government as an
active participant. In the second type, the federal-interstate
compact, the federal government is an active member of the
compact, often with voting rights (Muys, 1995; Zimmerman,
2012). Federal-interstate compacts address two major goals
for regional water resource planning and management; first,
providing a regional viewpoint to guide the development and
implementation of comprehensive water resource planning and,
second and perhaps more importantly, realizing meaningful
coordination of federal, state, and private resource planning
and activities (Muys, 1995). There are currently seven federalinterstate compacts; four of which deal with transboundary
water resource issues (Zimmerman, 2012).

The first factor recommended for successful interstate
water compacts is clearly defined boundaries. These
boundaries delineate both geographic borders (Muys et al.,
2007) as well as who may access the resources (See Ostrom,
1990). For successful water compacts, a river basin, including
its hydrologically connected subsurface waters, is considered
the optimal geographic boundary (Muys et al., 2007). This is
a critical aspect of compact development because when using
political boundaries, excellent management in one state can
be nullified by poor management in adjacent states sharing
the same river basin (Dellapenna, 2006). That being the case,
interstate management within the hydrological boundaries
of a river basin is substantially more likely to succeed
than management utilizing political boundaries. Defining
who may access the resources helps to avoid overuse and
resource depletion (See Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990) and is
critical for basin management.
A successful compact requires that allocation and
provision rules and local conditions be internally consistent
(See Ostrom, 1990). Too many water compacts have been
based on over-allocation from the beginning, generating
conflict and contributing to compact failure (Muys, 1995).
Instead, within each river basin, a “safe yield” should
be determined (Sherk, 2005) and water apportioned to
ensure that adequate stream flows are maintained in each
state (Muys et al., 2007). Monitoring is another element
of successful water compacts (Muys et al., 2007; Ostrom,
1990). In the model compact, disputes are resolved either
by agreement or administrative determination with states
having primary responsibility for enforcement of rules and
allocations (Muys et al., 2007; Sherk, 2005). Violations are
treated in ways that encourage “candor, cooperation, and
compliance” (Muys et al., 2007, p. 93). If these fail, then the
parties may initiate litigation (Muys et al., 2007).
The Importance of Compact Commissions
Because compact commissions are such an essential
part of many successful compacts they warrant special
attention. Compact commissions are, as Stephenson says,
“…how interstate water compacts make their greatest
contribution to water resource management” (2000, p.
99). These permanent commissions provide authority and
structure for the agreements (Stephenson, 2000), gather
information, meet and discuss water problems, develop
regulations to administer compacts, monitor water use, and
mediate conflict (Schlager and Heikkila, 2009). Compact
commissions also allow for the participation of stakeholders
in decision making and for transparency in processes and
outcomes (See the Delaware River Basin Compact, 1961).
According to the Utton model compact, commission
members include the governors of all of the signatory states
or their representatives, a single tribal representative elected
from all tribes who are parties to water allocation agreements
within the jurisdiction of the compact, and a federal
representative. This federal representative is appointed by
the President after consultation with federal agencies with
interests in the basin and he or she will actively participate in

SUCCESSFUL INTERSTATE COMPACTS
Successful interstate water compacts tend to share
certain characteristics. Viable compacts must be able to meet
and negotiate changing conditions, therefore, they must be
designed with flexibility in mind. Successful compacts are
often those specifically created for individual circumstances.
Also, successful compacts are those that can be implemented
with few external constraints. Another characteristic of
successful compacts is that they routinely involve water
resource management experts who have a better understanding
of technical data, long-term outcomes, and different available
options (Tarlock, cited in Stephenson, 2000). George Sherk
(2005) provides a list of institutional attributes that he argues
can contribute to creating effective compacts. Many of these
have been incorporated into the model compact developed by
the Utton Transboundary Resources Center in the University
of New Mexico’s School of Law (Muys, Sherk, and O’Leary,
2007) of which he is a co-author.
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the commission’s discussions. The federal representative will
coordinate the viewpoints of all federal agencies in the basin
with responsibilities related to water resources and present
a single, coordinated federal position during commission
deliberations (Muys et al., 2007).
Some of the powers that are critical to a strong commission
include the ability to carry out comprehensive planning,
making and enforcing rules, monitoring compliance, financing
and constructing projects, and approving intra- and inter-basin
transfers. Commissions are also empowered to acquire, hold,
convey and dispose of property, enter into contracts, sue and
be sued, issue permits, collect fees, levy taxes, and establish
standards. They can also negotiate for loans, grants, and services
and perform all functions required by the compact. Other
aspects of successful commission functioning include majority
voting rules with a tie-breaker provision, allowing the federal
member a vote, having power to act in an emergency, and other
necessary and proper ancillary powers (Muys et al., 2007).

The current compact was approved by Congress in
1961. In addition to the inclusion of the federal government
as a full partner, a major strength of this compact is that it is
administered by a commission with broad powers to carry out
its responsibilities. These powers include the critical ability
to borrow money and issue bonds, giving the commission the
wherewithal to maintain a necessary amount of independence.
Other successful aspects of the DRBC include the ability
to aid in the coordination and integration of federal, state,
municipal, and private agencies and the development of a
comprehensive plan addressing both immediate and long
range water resource needs (Delaware River Basin Compact,
1961; Muys, 1995). In addition, the DRBC also recognizes
the overarching importance of allocating water equitably,
without regard for artificially imposed borders; “…to apply
the principle of equal and uniform treatment to all water
users who are similarly situated and to all users of related
facilities, without regard to established political boundaries”
[emphasis added] (Delaware River Basin Compact, 1961,
Article 1, § 1.3, ¶ (e)).
This new compact resulted in a commission that was a
regulatory agency in addition to its planning and operational
functions. The new commission also has extensive authority
for hydropower development, pollution regulation, watershed
management, and the development of flood protection and
recreational facilities in addition to its former mandate
to provide public water supplies (Delaware River Basin
Compact, 1961; Dellapenna, 2005).
Most importantly, for states concerned with issues of
autonomy and sovereignty, it should be noted that in two
important ways, the DRBC’s regulatory system is more
limited than those of the states in the basin. First, water
withdrawal permits are only needed in “protected areas”
where water demand results in a shortage or interferes with
the Commission’s comprehensive plan. These permits can be
reviewed in any court with competent jurisdiction. Second, the
authority to issue withdrawal or diversion permits rests with
those states with an effective water use permitting system. In
a water emergency, however, state permits may be superseded
(Delaware River Basin Compact, 1961; Dellapenna, 2005).
Although a number of suits have been brought against it, the
success of the DRBC was such that, in 1970, it became the
template for the Susquehanna River Basin Compact (SRBC)
(Dellapenna, 2006).

The Delaware River Basin Compact
The Delaware River Basin Compact (DRBC), the first
federal-interstate compact developed, has emerged as a model
compact (Dellapenna, 2006; Muys, 1995; Zimmerman, 2012).
However, its beginnings were anything but ideal. New Jersey,
New York and Pennsylvania began negotiations regarding a
possible interstate compact as early as 1923. In 1926, New
York City, in a predatory move toward Delaware, announced
that it planned to utilize the river as a major municipal water
source – even though the city has no remotely riparian
claims on the river. This initiated an extended confrontation
between New York, an upper basin state, and the lower-basin
states of New Jersey and Pennsylvania. New Jersey sued in
the Supreme Court which applied the doctrine of equitable
apportionment with New York receiving about two thirds of
what New York City had originally requested. This was later
increased but not surprisingly, none of the states were satisfied
with the Supreme Court ruling (Dellapenna, 2005).
The equitable apportionment ruling did not create a
comprehensive integrated basin management system nor
could the Court return to the allocation plan every time a
new issue emerged. As a result, in 1936, the three states
created the Interstate Commission on the Delaware River
Basin (INCODEL). This commission was developed without
Congressional approval, indicating that neither the states nor
the federal government considered this agency a major player
in the basin. After the INCODEL failed, Delaware joined the
other three states in the basin in proposing the Delaware River
Basin Commission Compact. Adopted by the states in 1949,
it went into effect with congressional ratification in 1952.
This compact also failed. The Commission lacked the powers
needed to carry out the goals and objectives of the compact.
Specifically, the Commission had no authority to regulate
water usage even though different uses might interfere
significantly with the plans of the agency. Shortly after that
compact went into effect, the states began negotiations for the
second compact, the current Delaware River Basin Compact
(DRBC) (Dellapenna, 2005).

COMPACTING CHALLENGES
Compacts can and do fail. There are a variety of barriers
to developing and implementing successful interstate
water compacts. There are often diverse cultural, political,
historic and economic priorities that each group brings to the
negotiations. Parties to these types of agreements must often
cooperate and collaborate with others of widely divergent
interests (Mulroy, 2008).
Developing and implementing an interstate compact can
be a complicated, expensive, and time consuming project
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(Burke, 2004; Meyers citied in Stephenson, 2000). Because
of often substantial federal interests in the areas covered
by compacts, these agreements must also account for the
participation of these and other stakeholders (Mandarano
et al., 2008; Sherk, 2005). In some cases, state elections,
especially those for governor, may temporarily interrupt the
administration of a compact given the relationship between
that office and a compact commission. Ambiguous language
and unresolved issues can also plague a compact (Burke,
2004) while a lack of accurate data and faulty or no planning
for future development can threaten to derail elements of it
years down the road (McClurg, 1997).
A major issue in compact development is that states are
often reluctant to delegate significant authority to a regional
commission or other authority that they realize may not
always act in their best interest. Muys (1995) points out that
states should take into consideration that as they are more
able to restrain compact agencies to protect their sovereignty,
they are also increasing the likelihood that regional water
issues will escalate to the point that they will come under
federal jurisdiction, overriding state or local authority.

were present and were unable to compromise in many cases.
Politically, there was fallout for current office holders as no
matter what the outcomes, a number of stakeholders were
not going to agree. There were also technical issues such as
regulating flow versus regulating consumptive uses. Georgia
was willing to talk about one but not both. Finally, Georgia
negotiated from the position that they needed far more water
than the other states (Kerr in Burke, 2004), a position that
may have been hard to sell to Alabama and Florida.
The Colorado River Compact
Not the stunning success of the Delaware River Basin
Compact nor the abysmal failure of the ACT/ACF, the
1922 Colorado River Compact continues to be a source of
controversy. The primary purposes of the compact included
dividing the river flow between the states of the Upper Basin
(Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, and New Mexico) and the
Lower Basin (Arizona, California, and Nevada), eliminating
future disputes, and promoting the orderly development
and management of the river (Colorado River Governance
Initiative, 2010). However, the number and scope of
“agreements, contracts, treaties, laws, and court decisions”
(McClurg, 1997, p. 7) that make up “the law of the river”
governing the Colorado today, indicate that there was a
great deal of ground not covered in the original compact.
These topics include environmental issues, increasing
development, growing water shortages, water transfers, the
rights of Native Americans to water, and a possible dispute
with Mexico over water promised by treaty in 1944.
The Colorado River Compact was finally ratified as
part of the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, authorizing
the construction of the Hoover Dam and apportioning the
water of the lower basin between the states. A 1944 treaty
with Mexico further apportioned the river and in 1948, the
Upper Colorado River Basin Compact allocated the Upper
Basin apportionment by percentages between participating
states. Court cases and negotiated settlements delineate tribal
rights whose allocations are taken from the state in which the
reservation is located. The Law of the River also includes
Congressional authorization for a number of water projects
such as the Colorado River Storage Project Act in 1958 which
provided an Upper Basin Development Plan and construction
of the Glen Canyon Dam (Lake Powell). Even with the
compact, the Supreme Court has had to step in and specify
how much water each state was entitled to (See Arizona v.
California, 1963). The Court has revisited the issue numerous
times, the last time in 2006 (See Arizona v. California, 2006).
In addition, there are also a number of national and regional
environmental laws that are part and parcel of the Law of the
River (Colorado River Governance Initiative, 2010).
Given that, on average, water demands have exceeded
water supplies in the Colorado River Basin over the past
decade, there is little doubt that changes will need to be
made. In the future, decreased water flow due to even a
modest change in climate will be problematic. At high levels
of climate change, the lack of water will become disastrous
(Colorado River Governance Initiative, 2010; Robison and

The ACT and ACF Compacts
The Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa (ACT) and the
Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) compacts are
examples of failed efforts to find a solution to a growing water
crisis. Conflicts over water between Georgia, Alabama, and
Florida (the ACF) and between Georgia and Alabama (the
ACT) had resulted in a prolonged attempt to develop and
implement an interstate water compact. Although deadlines
for compact development were extended several times, the
states were unable to reach a compromise and no effective
compact has emerged (Dellapenna, 2006). This failure can be
attributed to several problems associated with water compacts.
Primarily, the states relentlessly protected their own
interests and failed to negotiate in good faith (Mandarano et al.,
2008; Stephenson, 2000). In addition, these compacts (ACT
and ACF) lacked many of the attributes that made the DRBC
and the SRBC so effective (Dellapenna, 2006). For example,
while the DRBC Commission has the power to allocate waters
to and among the compact states and to impose conditions,
the ACT/ACF Commission was limited to planning,
coordinating, monitoring, and making recommendations
concerning the water resources of the basin (Delaware
River Basin Compact, 1961; Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa
River Basin compact.1997; Apalachicola-ChattahoocheeFlint River Basin compact.1997). Another problem with the
ACF compact centers on the treatment of federal agencies
(Dellapenna, 2006). Given the huge federal expenditures in
the basin, in excess of $1.5 billion just for the Army Corps
of Engineers, the proposed compact called only for minimal
federal participation, an unacceptable situation for the U.S.
Department of Justice (Reno cited in Sherk, 2005).
Some of the problems with the ACT/ACF were not
related to compacts per se but are important in the negotiating
process. First, there were problems with negotiating in a public
forum. Stakeholders representing various organizations
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MacDonnell, 2014). In the event of a compact call, “Not
only might the Law of the River prove unmanageable, but
it may actually collapse under the weight of the situation”
(Colorado River Governance Initiative, 2010, p. 18).

in one state can lead to salt water intrusion in another
(Wachob et al., 2009).
South Carolina has four major river basins, three of
which it shares with neighboring states. The two largest, the
Yadkin–Pee Dee and the Catawba–Santee (aka the CatawbaWateree) are shared with North Carolina. The Savannah
Basin is shared with Georgia with a small, northernmost
portion located in North Carolina. The final basin, the
Ashepoo-Combahee-Edisto is located entirely within South
Carolina (Badr, Wachob, and Gellici, 2004) and is not subject
to transboundary issues with another state.
Of the three states - North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Georgia - South Carolina is currently the least populated and
is growing at the slowest rate. Even so, the state is predicted
to gain over a million people between 2000 and 2030. North
Carolina and Georgia are both more populous and growing
at considerably higher rates (See Table 1). From 2000 to
2030, according to predictions, North Carolina will gain
just over 4 million people and Georgia just under 4 million
(U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division, 2005). Given
the population differences across the states and the needs of
these populations for water as well as the desire for South
Carolina to grow, a solution will be needed that balances
these factors and the water resources equitably.
Even though it has a smaller and slower growing
population, South Carolina’s water resources are heavily
impacted by its faster growing neighbors. During drought
conditions, for example, both North Carolina and Georgia
increasingly rely on rivers shared with South Carolina.
Coastal cities such as Myrtle Beach depend on water supplies
from North Carolina and have experienced shortages. These
conditions make maintaining stream flow a major challenge
and increase the probability of conflict between states
sharing these resources (Burke, 2004, p. 296; Holman, 2008;
Wachob et al., 2009).
In 2009, South Carolina confronted North Carolina
in the U.S. Supreme Court regarding proposed water
withdrawals from the Catawba River. Interbasin transfers
in North Carolina endanger water quality and flow in the
coastal areas of South Carolina (League of Women Voters of
South Carolina Water Resources Study Committee, 2011).
This can be seen in South Carolina’s Yadkin-Pee Dee Basin
where the river is impacted by the upstream needs of six
reservoirs, all of which are located in North Carolina. At
the same time, salt water incursion into the lower Pee-Dee
River has resulted in a need for increases in the minimum

Other Challenges
The American Central Plains and Southwest regions are
currently suffering from extremely warm and dry conditions
which are expected to continue for decades (Cook, Ault, and
Smerdon, 2015). The Rio Grande is now being reduced to
“a trickle” due to lack of rain and continued consumption by
both metro and agricultural users. Arizona is preparing for
future cuts in its allocation from the Colorado River should
the water level in Lake Mead continue to fall (Wines, 2015).
On April 1st of this year, Governor Jerry Brown of California
announced mandatory water restrictions to help address the
current drought (Nagourney, 2015).
Some other problem spots for water resource
management include the Catawba River between North
and South Carolina as well as the Savannah River between
South Carolina and Georgia. On the Catawba, it appears that
neither state is willing to compact and disputes have already
erupted, lessening the chance of a viable compact in the near
future (Dyckman, 2008). In each case, critical decisions will
have to be made about water resources and one of the best
ways to do this will often be through interstate compacts.
SOUTH CAROLINA: A CASE STUDY OF
PROSPECTIVE COMPACT DEVELOPMENT
In addition to providing drinking water, water for
industry, irrigation, hydropower, waste assimilation,
transportation, and flood control, South Carolina’s water
ways also provide habitats for fish, wildlife and plant species
as well as migration routes critical for species reproduction
(Wachob, Park, and Newcome, 2009). Pressure is increasing
on these resources due to population growth as well as changes
in how water is used. In previous centuries, water use was,
for the most part, limited to instream and non-consumptive
uses - e.g., transportation, hydro-mechanical power, and
fishing. Burgeoning technology, however, has brought new
and more consumptive uses. In 2006, thermoelectric power,
for example, was second only to hydroelectric power in
water use in this state, utilizing some 3.5 trillion gallons of
surface water (Holman, 2008).
South Carolina, along with North Carolina and Georgia,
is facing a number of critical water resource issues. These
include but are not limited to water allocation, water quality,
drought management, salt water intrusion, assimilative
capacity, stream flow maintenance, ground water usage,
and flood control (Catawba-Wateree Basin Advisory
Commission. n.d.; Savannah River Basin Advisory Council,
n.d.; Wachob et al., 2009). These issues are important in
that efforts by one state to address a problem often impacts
another state in negative ways. For example, ground water
pumping to support development or combat water shortages
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flow required from North Carolina (Wachob et al., 2009).
Meanwhile, in Georgia, Atlanta is seeking potential water
sources that include Lake Hartwell (League of Women
Voters of South Carolina Water Resources Study Committee,
2011), on the border between South Carolina and Georgia,
and part of the Savannah River Basin.

who also oversees a major supplier of water to Atlanta, Lake
Lanier, can, at the very least increase the scope, accuracy
and reliability of the knowledge available and significantly
improve any compacting efforts.
Although the GWLRC acknowledges that various
state and federal agencies with interests in the environment
conduct activities within the Savannah River Basin, there
is no evidence of real concern about the environment itself.
The only mention of the Clean Water Act is related to
FERC relicensing and there is one mention of endangered
species. In reality, the Clean Water Act and the Endangered
Species Act will significantly impact the way states will
manage the Savannah River resources. The possible
consequences of these laws must be incorporated into any
viable compact. In addition to support from the GWLRC, the
2004 South Carolina Water Plan (Badr et al.) also calls for
the development of a compact between the state and others
that share water resources. “Compacts”, the authors point
out, “will promote interstate coordination, reduce potential
disputes between the states, enhance the flow regime of
many of South Carolina’s rivers and extend the availability
of water during severe droughts” (p. vi).
Like its South Carolina counterpart, the Georgia
Comprehensive State-wide Water Management Plan (Georgia
Environmental Protection Division, 2008) recognizes the
need for flexibility, the importance of including various
stakeholders, and the need for relevant and accurate data.
However, unlike the South Carolina plan, there is no mention
of the possibility of a compact or any coordinated effort with
South Carolina regarding the Savannah River.
The Savannah River Basin Water Caucus, a joint effort
between South Carolina and Georgia, is composed of
legislators from counties on both sides of the river. A major
purpose of the Caucus is to avoid lengthy and costly litigation
between the states as South Carolina threatens action against
Georgia over water allocation. While there has been mention
of an interstate water compact for the Savannah Basin (Cary,
2013), it is too early in the process to determine if this option
will actually reach the Caucus’ agenda.
An earlier effort, the Savannah River Basin Partnership
between the Georgia Environmental Protection Division and
the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental
Control was established by Governor Sanford of South
Carolina and Governor Perdue of Georgia in 2005. Major
topics for this group included salt water intrusion into the
Upper Floridan aquifer, dissolved oxygen standards along
with associated Total Daily Maximum Loads (TDML), and
sustainable water use in the basin. Currently, the status
of shared planning for this group includes the previously
mentioned Georgia Comprehensive State-Wide Water
Management Plan (Georgia Environmental Protection
Division, 2008) and the South Carolina Water Plan (Badr et
al., 2004). There’s no indication of comprehensive basinwide planning by the two states (Georgia Environmental
Protection Division and SC Department of Health and
Environmental Control, n.d.). In April of 2012, Governor
Haley of South Carolina signed Executive Order 2012-05,

The Savannah River Basin
The Savannah River begins in North Carolina, forms
the boundary between Georgia and South Carolina and
empties into the Atlantic at the port of Savannah. The
river basin has a number of important issues that will
either require cooperative efforts between the states or
may escalate into litigation. Among these are water quality
issues, drought, economic development and population
growth, fish and wildlife concerns, regulatory issues
and the Savannah Harbor Expansion Project (Georgia
Environmental Protection Division and SC Department
of Health and Environmental Control, n.d.; SC Savannah
River Basin Advisory Council, n.d.).
In a 2004 report, the South Carolina Governor’s Water
Law Review Committee (GWLRC) supported a compact
with Georgia as a viable method to apportion the resources
of the Savannah River Basin. However, while recognizing
that both states have an interest in the entire river and that
there is a need for consistency between the states in areas
such as water quality standards and FERC relicensing
(Governor’s Water Law Review Committee, 2004), it does
not appear that there are any recommendations for a strong,
resilient, basin-wide governing body similar to those found
in more successful water compacts. In fact, the GWLRC
specifically suggests that the compact utilize various
protocols that would “obligate each state to manage its basin
resources in a consistent manner” (Governor’s Water Law
Review Committee, 2004, p. 24) but carefully avoids any
commitment to common governance. That being said, the
GWLRC has highlighted a number of elements that may
contribute to the development and ratification of a successful
Savannah River Compact.
When discussing the allocation of the usable water,
the Committee acknowledges the many stakeholders
involved, including the significant role of the Army Corps
of Engineers (CoE) and other federal agencies. In case of
drought, cooperation and coordination with the CoE will
be essential since they control significant resources on the
river. Another positive element from the GWLRC report is
the recognition of the importance of accurate data. Unlike
the Colorado River Compact, where the river was overallocated from the beginning, having a realistic estimate of
the available water supply can only enhance the working of
any compact that may emerge.
The GWLRC proposal also advocates addressing
the looming issue of interbasin transfers. It specifically
notes that while Greenville and Beaufort-Jasper together
are permitted to access 210 million gallons per day from
the basin, Georgia also has the potential for a very large
transfer from the Savannah. Again, inclusion of the CoE,
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re-establishing the Governor’s Savannah River Committee
of South Carolina, initiating another round in the South
Carolina/Georgia talks.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina are facing
water resource management issues that are becoming
increasingly common, even east of the 100th meridian. It
is critical now that states develop a method or methods for
solving their differences that reach beyond their tendency, and
that of their agencies, to protect their own interests ahead of
those of the basin. By utilizing interstate water compacts with
adequate power and resources to carry out comprehensive
planning, coordination, and management (Hayton and Utton,
1989), the basin itself, in the form of the commission, becomes
a principal actor. Depending on the organizational structure,
either state agencies or agencies developed and implemented
by the commission itself are responsible for carrying out the
mandates of the compact within the basin. Monitoring (See
Ostrom, 1990), transparency, and accountability reduce
agency costs and promote trust (See Gortner, Nichols, and
Ball, 2007) in the commission even as it acts as an agent for
the stakeholders in the basin.
Developing a compact can be a long and complex
process. The time to start is now. In riparian states, the
state with the fastest growth may have an advantage in
court cases, especially when the faster growing state has
already appropriated water. In these instances, courts may be
unwilling to limit existing diversions (Kansas v. Colorado,
1907; Burke, 2004). If it’s true, as Burke suggests, that Metro
Atlanta’s position as the fastest growing area in the region
gives Georgia an advantage over Alabama with regard to
the Chattahoochee (2004), then Georgia will also have the
advantage over South Carolina regarding the Savannah. In
addition, if the issues between North Carolina and South
Carolina move to litigation in the Yadkin-Pee Dee Basin,
South Carolina, because of its slower growth may be at a
disadvantage there, too.
South Carolina and North Carolina have shown that
they can work together in the Catawba-Wateree Basin.
The next move forward is to begin conversations about
the possibilities of developing federal-interstate compacts
utilizing the components that have been so effective on the
Delaware and Susquehanna river systems. As contracts,
these compacts can provide protection from both prior
and subsequent legislation (Florestano, 1994) and with the
federal government as a partner, they can garner cooperation
from a major player in water resource management.
Given Georgia’s history with Alabama and Florida, South
Carolina should immediately exert concentrated and sustained
efforts to start negotiations toward the development of a
compact with that state. This effort should be made in good
faith and with the understanding that each state has the right
to an equitable utilization of the water resource as well as a
duty to avoid appreciable harm to a co-basin state (See Hayton
and Utton, 1989, p. 672). At the same time, South Carolina
should also consider taking the initial steps prior to filing an
action in the Supreme Court for equitable apportionment. This
could provide leverage for South Carolina while encouraging
Georgia to negotiate (Holman, 2008).

The Catawba-Wateree and Yadkin-Pee Dee Basins
In the face of what will likely become critical water
shortages, North and South Carolina have both developed
legislation supporting River Basin Advisory Commissions
for the Catawba-Wateree and Yadkin-Pee Dee basins (North
Carolina General Assembly, n.d.; South Carolina General
Assembly, 2004). Very similar to the process for developing
a compact, each state adopted legislation that specifies the
scope of each commission’s work as well as the composition,
responsibilities, and powers of the commissions. In fact,
there are many similarities between the legislation for these
commissions and the Utton Center’s model compact (See
Muys et al., 2007). A major difference however, is that by
law, the commissions are advisory only in nature: There are
no provisions for regulatory or other administrative authority.
It is important to note that the Catawba-Wateree River
Basin Commission (CWRBAC or the Basin Commission)
provides an example of a unified approach to basin
management much like those found in the most successful
compacts. Briefly, the Basin Commission provided a
platform for South Carolina and North Carolina, along with
Duke Energy, the Catawba River Water Supply Project, and
other stakeholders to negotiate an agreement to resolve South
Carolina v. North Carolina without further litigation and
expense (See South Carolina v. North Carolina settlement
agreement, 2010). The Settlement Agreement reflects
the joint nature of the negotiations, especially given the
alternative of further litigation …by reaching this Agreement the Parties will
achieve a better result than could be achieved
through the Litigation with a substantial cost
savings to the taxpayers and ratepayers in
both States. The Parties also believe that it is
important that the States regard each other as
close neighbors, which share the CatawbaWateree River (“River”), rather than as a
plaintiff and a defendant in a lawsuit and that
this Agreement will be a model for regional
cooperation (2010, p. 1).
In adopting a common approach to managing the
resources of the river basin, North Carolina and South
Carolina have taken an important first step toward an
eventual compact should one be desired.
While the Catawba-Wateree Basin Advisory
Commission has been active since its initial development,
there is insufficient evidence to indicate that a viable YadkinPee Dee Basin Advisory Commission has emerged. Perhaps
the issues that led to South Carolina v. North Carolina acted
to spur the creation and maintenance of the Catawba-Wateree
Basin Commission whereas the Yadkin-Pee Dee has not yet
reached that critical state.
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Compacts are not the solution for every interstate water
problem. However, they do supply a platform that can be
tailored to each unique situation and they can also have builtin flexibility to deal with issues that have not yet emerged
when legislation is passed enabling the compact. By treating
a river basin as a political entity in its own right, a compact
can provide local stakeholders control of a resource that
impacts so many water users in so many ways.
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